RAILWAY SAMACHAR

TRAIN ACCIDENTS

AND ACCOUNTABILITY

During Eighties it was the version of the Railway Board that 67.4% of the accidents were

due to HUMAN FAILURE. When Mr.George Fernandez was the Railway Minister he

announced in the Parliament, ‘failure of human element had been the largest single factor

contributing to railway accidents. To minimize the risk of human failure, the Railways are

going in for modern safety aids such as auxiliary warning system, track circuiting, panel

interlocking, installation of axle counters, route relay interlocking and train actuated warning

devices at the level crossings”.

Year after year no Railway Minister forgets in his Budget speech to mention how many

crores are allocated for ensuring safety. And indeed lot of modernization, mechanization

and automation has been undertaken in Railways. But after two and half decades of sinking

cores of Rupees what is the official version on HUMAN FAILURE now? You will be

surprised to know that 85.19% of the accidents are caused due to HUMAN FAILURE.

Strange indeed despite in depth inquiries having been conducted ‘religiously’ and

‘laboriously’ by the ‘Commissioner of Railway Safety of the Circle’ concerned. Can anyone

throw some light on the ludicrously illogical and irrational situation of rising HUMAN

FAILURE?

During August 1995, the nation was shocked by the 400-odd death in the accident near

Ferozabad. Indian Express interviewed one Shri.A.V.Jacob, former Retired Chief

Commissioner of Railways Safety, on 1.9.1995. He said,

“Over zealous Railway Officials are quick to trot out the usual excuse for mishaps, ‘human

failure’, which helps to transfer the onus on some lowly-placed employee, not withstanding

the infrastructural lacunae.”

Nothing can be more authentic than such a strong comments from a Retired CCRS of

India Railways (IR). He further illustrated how he could put it so precisely. He compared the

Ferozabad accident to two prior accidents. One that took place in the year 1974 near Naini

near Allahabad wherein two Goods Trains had collided. The other one was that of Deluxe

Express accident during 1977. And according to Mr.A.V.Jacob, the Ferozabad accident

was a replica of the mentioned two accidents. According to him the unfortunate rail mishap

at Ferozabad which took toll of 400-odd passengers could have been averted, had the

Railway Board taken note of the Railway Safety Commission’s warnings, forwarded several

years ago concerning certain administrative lapses on the Delhi-Howrah section, which is

one of the busiest rail section in the country. He further elaborated on the issue on hand.

“A three member committee inquired into the accident and it had concluded that the NON

TRACK CIRCUITING OF THE SECTION FROM THE STARTER – THE FIRST SIGNAL

AND THE ADVANCE STARTER had prevented the signals being taken off when a train is

standing between these .This was a great safety risk, the committee had said and had

recommended that track circuiting be undertaken to avoid any recurrence of such mishap.

The subsequent course of events aptly indicate that the recommendations was dealt with

such an indifference that circumstances were hardly changed before the Deluxe Express

rammed into the goods train three years later”

In the year 1980 ‘Sikhri Committee’ went into minute details on the never ceasing

accidents in IR and while submitting its report on Railway Safety declared that 87% OF

COLLISION INVOLVING DISEL LOCOMOTIVES ARE DUE TO LONG HOOD LEADING.

And it is relevant to recall that during Eighties it was the version of the Railway Board that

67.4% of the accidents were due to HUMAN FAILURE. And the current version of the

Railway Authorities is that 85.19% of the accidents are due to HUMAN FAILURE. Twenty

five long years back a ‘Specialist Committee’ set up by the Government of India declared

‘LONG HOOD DRIVING’ is a safety menace and it contributed to 87% of the accidents

involving Diesel Locomotives.

Coming to 01.01.2004, after two and half decades, T.No.597 Harihar-Hubli Passenger in

Mysore Division of South Western Railway worked by a Diesel Loco with Long Hood

Leading derailed at Karajgi Station, the Driver having passed the ‘Starter’ at danger. There

was no passenger casualty, by God’s grace. The ‘Inquiry Officer’ who conducted the

‘Disciplinary’ proceedings states in his findings, “Long Hood leading has the disadvantages

of reducing the visibility to the extent of 12 to 14 metres and the smoke also adversely

affect the driver on visibility”.

Justice Sikhri had precisely put down his paper in the year 1980 attributing 87% of the

accidents to Long Hood Driving and in the year 2004 when there is an accident on similar

lines one should introspect who shall be held accountable under such circumstances.

Whether the Authorities who had failed to overcome this adversity or the field worker,

namely the Loco Pilot. But needless to speculate the Accountability the Loco Pilot was

reverted as Shunter while the GM, DRM and the DME who were prima facie responsible for

the accident for having allowed the train to be worked with Long Hood Driving were let off.

Every Railway Minister and the top Railway officers speak of increasing the speed

forgetting the deterrent factor that majority of the trains are hauled by Diesel Locos and

while on one trip they work with ‘Short Hood’ leading, on the other trip they work with ‘Long

Hood’ leading which has been identified two and half decades back as MOST UNSAFE.

While the Ministry and Railway Board is totally silent on the ways and means to ‘off set’ the

adversary, they do not hesitate to speak on increasing the speed of the trains. Visibility is

prime factor for speed and that happens to be FIRST CASUALTY in IR. Because to put in a

simple fashion what is an accident? When a driver fails to stop where he has to stop is an

accident. And the visibility is the crucial factor that enables the driver to stop the train at the

right spot.

A decade back every Terminal and Junctions stations had ‘Engine Turn Tables’. It is

strange on what logic the Authorities have done away with this infrastructure. Therefore it is

time the management restored the ‘Engine Turn Tables’ that were available in terminal and

junction stations in phased manner with a maximum of 3 years. Financial implications cannot

be the excuse as the construction of Engine Turn Tables do not involve huge sums of

money. Even otherwise it shall be borne in mind every accident cost the Railways, rather the

exchequer, in millions. The authorities shall draw the lines-if they could repeatedly spend

mindlessly in lakhs in replacing the tiles of floors of the Platforms all over India not to speak

on this vanity at Bangalore City, why not they construct the much needed ‘Engine Turn

Tables’. Perhaps the Railway Ministry and Railway Board can afford ‘vanities’ rather than

‘realities’ because the accountability, to recall Sri.A.V.Jacob, the onus lies on some

lowly-placed employee, not withstanding the infrastructural lacunae.

Another factor that ensures safe train operations is sufficient brake power.

Shri.B.Jayajaya Rao, another Retired Chief Commissioner of Railways in his letter that

appeared in Hindu on 26.8.1995 states that ‘track circuiting, provision of axle counters on

main lines, absolute block system, interlocking of signals, ensuring sufficient brake power

on trains are vital to over come ‘human failure’ since human being is prone to err.

But is the Railway Ministry and the Railway Board really trying to do anything on improving

the Brake Power of the Trains? The less said the better. The Ministry and the Board has

reduced the vital ‘Brake Power’ a laughing stock despite the introduction of ‘Air Brake’

braking system. Instead of improving and enhancing the ‘percentage of brake power’, they

have come to the philanthropic stage of ‘FADING OF BRAKE’. Indeed a way to down load

the ‘Accountability’ factor on the Loco Pilots. The norms of 85% Brake Power for Goods at

the originating station and 100% for Passenger (and Express) trains has been reduced to

70% on the run. Well, have they incorporated any device/meter on the loco to know at a

glance the percentage of brake power available on the run? Absolutely no because ‘mere

availability of sufficient brake pressure/vacuum does not speak on the quantum of brake

power available since quantum of brake pressure/vacuum does not reflected the quality of

brake rigging. The result is that the trains are run with sufficient brake power on papers and

not in reality.

A very recent incident on the matter is worth considering. The Yeshwanthpur – Howrah

Express (T.No.8004) was started from Yeshwanthpur on 01.8.2005 with 100% Brake Power

according to the ‘Brake Power Certificate’ issued at Yeshwanthpur. The Loco Pilot tested

the ‘Brake Power’ at Whitefield and to his surprise he experienced the ‘brake power’

wanting. He immediately flashed a message for checking the ‘Brake Power’ at Jolarpettai,

the next Junction and when it was checked at Jolarpettai, the Brake Power was found to be

less by 5%. This 5% reduction in Brake Power has taken place at Whitefield which is just 25

KMs from Yeshwanthpur, the Originating Station at which it was certified to possess 100%

Brake Power. The total distance from Yeshwanthpur to Howrah is 1993 KMs and if one to

account 5% fading of brake for 25 KMs and some plus and minus on the grace side,

perhaps this train is likely to reach Howrah with least or nil or minus Braking Power. If this

train were to have faced the destiny, it will be destiny of the Loco Pilot under the charge of

‘BELATED APPLICATION OF BRAKE’.


Hon’ble former Railway Minister as found at the out set has spoken about modernization

and other improvement in safety systems. But what is the so called modernisation and

automation in IR in relevance to Station Masters category, which was defined as the “ICONS

OF INDIAN RAILWAYS’ by Shri.Rathnavel Pandian, Chairman of Fifth Pay Commission.

Whether the so called modernisation has reduced the SMs’ work load or they have

increased their work load? According to a Member/Traffic/RB. Lr. No.2002/Safety

(A&R)/26/5 New Delhi dated 11.2.2003 addressed to all COMs & CSOs, the duties

assigned to SMs have become humanly impossible to be discharged in accordance with

rule. This precarious condition has increased the ‘accountability factor’ with regard to SMs

in an unimaginable manner. The mentioned RB letter states as:

“Over the years it has been observed, despite heavy investment in modernization,

automation and mechanization, station staff is being assigned additional responsibilities.

There is an urgent need to scrutinize and assess whether it is humanly possible to handle all

assigned duties, faithfully, according to the spirit of the prescribed procedure.

While the RB letter states so the Commissioner of Railways Safety, Eastern circle on

completion of his inquiry into rear-end collision and subsequent derailment of 214 Dn

Mokama-Howrah Passenger train with 132 Dn at Dumri halt of ER has inter-alia made the

following recommendation:

16.0 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSIONS.

16.1 The SM/ASM are the most stressed category due to excess work load. The roadside

station staff performing simultaneous. operating and commercial duties get highly stressed

due to role overload, role conflict and unreasonable pressure. His occupational stress index

is alarmingly high and he is highly dissatisfied with his job and management.

16.2 The aforesaid reasons often force the SMs to resort to unfair and unsafe practices. At

a number of roadside stations it can be observed that either an outsider handles the work of

ticket booking or the porter handles the job of train passing.

Thus the vital cadres like Station Masters and Loco Pilots have become the first and

foremost cadres to be made accountable in every accident even before the Commissioner

of Railways Safety starts his inquiry.

Finally, accountability may have the meaning of accountable, responsible, required to

account for one's conduct, explicable, understandable etc. in the ‘Dictionaries’ meant for

every body except the Station Masters, Loco Pilots and other Safety Category staff in ‘IR’

for the reasons above. For these staff ‘Accountability’ means SF11 and SF5 (Minor and

Major Penalty Charge Memorandum respectively). Certainly not for the top notches in IR

who are the luckiest lot to avail only perks and benefits and not (ac)countable for lapses.

Just like that whenever some one mentions of ‘Accountability’ in Railways it is inevitable to

recall anything else than that of the ‘CASUAL STRIKE’ by the Railway Officers during 1997.

A decade back it was a whirlwind of accidents in IR. The Railway Ministry was in a tight spot.

They were pushed to the wall. It was Mr.Ramvilas Paswan who was at the helm of affairs as

Minister for Railways. Mr.Paswan decided for the first time to hold the top railway

bureaucracy RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER ON THE TRACK OF IR. He

TRANSFERRED THREE GENERAL MANAGERS accountable for the accident!

Mr.Pasvan had to face the toughest challenge (!) thrown against him by the Railway Officers

and the ‘FEDERATION OF RAILWAY OFFICERS ASOCIATION. The Officers all over

Indian Railways went on a MASS CASUAL LEAVE ON 23।9.1997. With this sort of attitude on the part of the top officers of IR, assurance of Total Safety to the innocent traveling public in Indian Railways is a far off Dream. Certainly not unreachable.
But only through accountability on the part of top bureaucracy.

About the Author

Com. G. RAJAN, Ex.SM/SBC/SWR. A dedicated, die hard comrades for Principla, Removed, refused to appologice for no fault of him. Dedicated and Morden Thinking.